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BIANNUAL SURVEY
The court's rejection of the arithmetical approach of dividing the
total recovery by the number of defendants in favor of a more
equitable division has long-standing judicial acceptance in the area
of derivative liability.8 4 The majority noted that it was not to be
confined to such situations, but rather was to be utilized when the
nature of the association of the defendants involved allowed the
imposition of a more equitable result.8 5
Thus, the practitioner should be sensitive to the strict inter-
pretation accorded the term "defendant" in CPLR 1401, and to the
possibility of a judicial determination of pro rata share at variance
with the arithmetical formula.
ARTICLE 30- REMEDIES AND PLEADING
CPLR 3012: Service of pleadings and demand for complaint.
In Waldron v. Ward,86 plaintiff appealed from an order which
granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for neglect to
prosecute. The appellate division affirmed, holding, however, that
the action should have been dismissed under CPLR 3012(b) for
failure to serve a complaint and proceed with the action. The court
noted that the motion to dismiss was for failure to serve a
complaint 87 and not for neglect to prosecute. 8  After serving the
summons, the plaintiff did nothing for forty months and the
appellate division found that there was nothing in the record to
justify such delay. The instant case was an action to recover for
personal injuries. Presumably, the three-year statute of limitations
had expired at the time of the dismissal for the forty-month
delay.
CPLR 3012(b) provides for the dismissal of an action when a
plaintiff fails to serve a complaint within twenty days after a
written demand by the defendant. Under a similar provision in the
CPA, dismissals were generally granted when there was no valid
excuse for the delay and no meritorious claim was shown. 9 CPLR
84 Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 178 N.E. 389 (1938).
8 5 Lyons v. Provencial, 20 App. Div. 2d 875, 248 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1st
Dep't 1964).
8 24 App. Div. 2d 470, 260 N.Y.S2d 850 (2d Dep't 1965).
87 CPLR 3012(b) provides: "If the complaint is not served with the
summons, the defendant may serve a written demand for the complaint. If
the complaint is not served within twenty days after service of the demand,
the court upon motion may dismiss the action."
88 CPLR 3216 provides for the dismissal, upon motion, or on the court's
own initiative, of an action for unreasonable neglect to prosecute. This section
does not speak expressly in terms of a complaint, but speaks in terms of a
general neglect to prosecute, and of a failure to timely file and serve a
note of issue.
80 CPA § 257. See The Biannual Survey of New York Practice, 39
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 406, 441 (1965).
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3216, provides for the dismissal of an action when a party un-
reasonably neglects to proceed with the prosecution of his cause.
It is vitally important for courts to carefully indicate the ground
upon which a dismissal is granted. CPLR 205(a) 00 provides that
a plaintiff may commence a new action within six months after
the termination of a prior action if it is dismissed for other than
neglect to prosecute, voluntary discontinuance, or final judgment
on the merits. Therefore, where a cause of action is dismissed
for neglect to prosecute under CPLR 3216, the CPLR 205 (a)
extension of the statute of limitations would not apply 1
Would the six-month extension be afforded a plaintiff where
his action was dismissed for failure to serve a complaint under the
provisions of CPLR 3012(b)? This is a rather difficult problem.
It would seem that the provisions of CPLR 205(a) excepting a
dismissal for neglect to prosecute from the extension of the
statute of limitations is not limited to a CPLR 3216 dismissal.
Loomis V'. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 2 held that a dismissal for
failure to serve a complaint under, tht predecessor of CPLR 3012(b)
was the equivalent of a dismissal for failure to prosecute and, as
such, the statute of limitations was not tolled as permitted by the
analogue of -CPLR 205(a). It might reasonably be argued that
inasmuch as a dismissal for failure to prosecute is still excluded
by CPLR 205(a), the result should be the same under CPLR
3012(b). However, due to the difference in terminology between
CPLR 3012(b) and CPLR 3216, some'authorities are of the opinion
that not every dismissal for failure to comply *ith a demand under
CPLR 3012(b) should constitute a failure to prosecute within the
scope of CPLR 205(a). According to this view, when the period
of time that has elapsed between the demand for the complaint
and the. motion to dismiss the action is so considerable that it
equates with the kind of neglect to prosecute portrayed in CPLR
3216, there should be no extension of the statute of limitations
under CPLR 205(a). If the delay is of shorter duration, and
if there is no substantial prejudice to the defendant, the benefit
of the six-month extension of the statute of limitations should be
permitted. As one authority states: "An overzealous defendant
90 The predecessor of CPLR 205 (a) was CPA § 23.
91 1 W. nSTEN, Koax & MLLmE, NEW YoRK CIvIL PRAcrcE ff205.06
(1965) ; see also 4 WEINSTMN, KORN & MiLLmE, NENw YoRx Civn PRAcricE
13216.14 (1965) ; Sorinto v. Fisher, 20 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1st
Dep't 1963) ; Parshall v. Grand Leasing Corp., 17 App. Div. 2d 953, 233 N.Y.S.
2d 777 (2d Dep't 1962).
92256 App. Div. 443, 10 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dep't 1939); see generally
Houle v. Wilde, 22 App. Div. 2d 727, 253 N.Y.S.2d 234 (3d Dep't 1964);
Flannery v. Stewart, 22 App. Div. 2d 786, 254 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1st Dep't 1964) ;
Simmons v. New York City Trans. Auth., (Sup. Ct. Kings County), 153
N.Y.L.J., March 5, 1965, p. 18, col. 2.
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should not reap the benefit of a statute of limitations defense be-
cause of a minor defalcation on the part of the plaintiff." 93
In opposition to the foregoing view, it is submitted that a
dismissal under CPLR 3012(b) should be the equivalent of a
dismissal for neglect to prosecute under CPLR 3216. If a plaintiff
does not deem it worthwhile to serve a complaint, this, in itself
would seem to be a neglect to prosecute as a matter of law. Such
neglect to prosecute should not warrant the six-month extension
provided by CPLR 205 (a). So holding would serve as a sufficient
stimulus to plaintiffs who fail to serve their complaint. If, however,
the court finds that the failure to serve the complaint was excusable,
it would not dismiss the action under CPLR 3012(b).
It should be further noted that if the CPLR 3012(b) dismissal
is independent of a CPLR 3216 dismissal, the plaintiff would not
be able to rely upon the forty-five day notice provision of CPLR
3216 to resist a motion under CPLR 3012(b). In any case, it
seems that as soon as a substantial period of time expires after a
defendant demands a complaint under CPLR 3012 (b), the defendant
may move under that section to dismiss the complaint. He may
then label the motion one to dismiss for neglect to prosecute, or
have the motion so treated without labeling it as such. In either
case, the plaintiff would not have to serve a forty-five day demand
as a condition to his motion.9 4
CPLR 3013: Particularity of statements in pleadings.
In Loudin v. Mohawk Airlines, Inc.,9 5 plaintiff sued for de-
famation and other injuries. The appellate division held that the
complaint purporting to allege malicious intent to interfere with
plaintiff's right to employment was insufficient because it stated
neither facts sufficient to show that plaintiff would have obtained
employment but for defendant's interference nor did it plead special
damages by reason of such interference.
Under the CPA, a pleading had to state "material facts."9 6
The present requirement under the CPLR requires statements suf-
ficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the trans-
actions, and the material elements of each cause of action.9 7 The
stress of the new statutory provisions seems to be placed on the
requirement that the pleadings be sufficiently detailed to give the
parties and the court notice of the event relied upon as a cause of
action and of the rule of law being invoked." On the one
93 3 Wrx =sm, KoPN & MmiLmu, Nmv Yopm CIV-L PRACTICz f1 3012.15
(1965).
94 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3012, supp. commentary 49-50 (1965).
9524 App. Div. 2d 447, 260 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1st Dep't 1965).
96 CPA § 241.
97 CPLR 3013.
98 FIRsT REP. 261-65.
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